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Combating Trademark Squatting in China: New 
Developments in Chinese Trademark Law and 
Suggestions for the Future 
 
By Sunny Chang* 
 
Abstract: This Note explores the phenomenon of trademark squatting in China.  
Several characteristics relating to the development of Chinese Trademark Law, such 
as the first-to-file and multi-class application system, as well as the inherent 
complexities of the Chinese language, contributed to creating an environment 
amenable to trademark squatting.  New developments in China, including a December 
2011 opinion from the Supreme Court and a recent amendment to Chinese Trademark 
Law, signal that the country is moving forward towards stronger protection of 
intellectual property.  However, these changes will likely not be enough to prevent 
trademark squatters from targeting well-known foreign trademarks, since they still do 
not address key factors that allow trademark squatting to persist.  Until China 
addresses these concerns, practitioners and businesses should be aware of the 
difficulties of protecting trademarks in China, and they should take measures to 
intelligently guard their intellectual property.  
 
* J.D., 2014, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., Biology, 2007, Amherst College.  I would 
like to thank my family for their love and support, as well as the numerous editors of the Northwestern 
Journal of International Law and Business for their hard work in publishing this Note. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
When Apple tried to introduce its wildly popular iPhone into one of 
the biggest markets in the world, China, the company was in for an 
unpleasant surprise.1  Though Apple had made the first application for the 
iPhone trademark with the Chinese Trademark Office (CTMO) in 2002, 
they only filed in a subclass for “computers and computer software.”2  
Soon after, a Chinese company called Hanwang Technology registered the 
iPhone mark under the proper subclass that included “phones and mobile 
phones.”3  Apple fought in vain to reclaim the mark, and it ultimately lost 
in its opposition at the CTMO as well as in an appeal to the Trade Mark 
Review and Adjudication Board (TRAB).4  Apple reluctantly paid the 
$3.65 million to Hanwang Technology for rights to the trademark.5 
 





5 Id.; Peter Ollier, iPad Loss Highlights Squatting Concerns, 215 MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 46, 46 
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Hanwang Technology is an example of a “trademark squatter,” a term 
defined as “a company or individual who registers another party’s brand 
name as a trademark and then uses the trademark in connection with the 
sale of counterfeit goods or in an effort to otherwise profit from the 
goodwill of the genuine brand name owner.”6  Once the registration is 
approved, the trademark squatter becomes the rightful owner of the 
trademark and has rights that can prevent the original brand name owner 
from using its mark, both in connection with the sale of products there and 
in connection with the manufacture of products for export.7  Trademark 
squatting in China is a big roadblock for multinational corporations that are 
looking to enter the Chinese market, and it has affected a spectrum of well-
known businesses, including Apple,8 Chivas Regal,9 Land Rover,10 
Ferrari,11 Remy Martin,12 and Hermès.13  Sports stars like Kobe Bryant14 
and Michael Jordan have also been affected.15 
 
(Dec. 9, 2011). 
6 Patricia E. Campbell & Michael Pecht, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Intellectual Property 
Protections in China, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 69, 78 (2012). 
7 Id. 
8 Ollier, supra note 5. 
9 In 2012, Chivas Regal failed in its opposition of a squatter’s application for the “Chivas Regal 88 
& Device” mark on clothing.  The court held that Chivas Regal was not well known in China at the time 
of the squatter’s application.  He Jing, Chivas Regal Lost Trademark Fight in China, ZY PARTNERS 
LEGAL NEWSLETTER (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.zypartners.com/zjys/Blog/show_e.asp?newsid=97. 
10 British car maker, Land Rover Group Ltd., fought for ten years against Chinese automaker, 
Geely, to reclaim the mark “luhu,” or “陸虎” in traditional Chinese.  10 Year Trademark Saga Between 
Gleely [sic] and Land Rover Comes to an End?, PATENT BRIC (May 2, 2011), http://patentbric.com/?p=133. 
11 The Beijing First Intermediate Court held that Ferrari’s prancing horse design was not well 
known in China, allowing a Chinese department store to register and use the mark in clothing.  Jing Luo 
& Shubha Ghosh, Protection and Enforcement of Well-Known Mark Rights in China: History, Theory 
and Future, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 119, 141–50 (2009). 
12 E. Remy Martin & Co. has filed a judicial appeal with the Beijing First Intermediate People’s 
Court after the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board denied its opposition against the trademark 
application for “人头马,” or “Ren Tou Ma” (a word that is widely associated with Remy Martin’s XO 
within China), in the computer category.  He Jing & Gu Ting, Remy Martin and Chanel are Fighting 
Hard with Trademark Pirates in China, ZY PARTNERS LEGAL NEWSLETTER (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://www.zypartners.com/zjys/Blog/show_e.asp?newsid=71. 
13 Hermès, a luxury brand based in France, lost its trademark dispute in China against a menswear 
company that had registered the name “爱玛仕” (Ai Ma Shi), after neglecting to register the Chinese 
translation of Hermès, which is “爱马” (Ai Ma).  The two marks contain very similar Chinese 
characters with the same pronunciation.  Ann Yan, China: Hermes and Chivas—The Disadvantages of 
Not Being the First to File Applications for Trade Marks in China, MONDAQ (last updated Apr. 2, 2012), 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/170806/Trademark/Hermes+and+Chivas+The+Disadvantages+of+Not+Being
+the+First+to+File+Applications+for+Trade+Marks+in+China. 
14 The Trademark Review and Adjudication Board denied Nike’s opposition to a Chinese 
individual who registered the name of Los Angeles Lakers star Kobe Bryant in Class 18, which covers 
items such as handbags and wallets.  Peter Leung, Kobe Bryant Fights for Chinese Trade Mark, 222 
MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 31, 31 (July 18, 2012). 
15 Id. (“Michael Jordan filed a lawsuit against Qiaodan Sportswear, which registered the Chinese 
version of his name, (‘Qiaodan’).”).   
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The significance of the Chinese market has increased exponentially in 
recent years with the modernization of the Chinese economy.  In 2011, 
China had already overtaken Japan as the world’s second-biggest 
economy.16  Although the United States’ economy is currently almost three 
times the size of China’s economy, at its current rate of growth, analysts 
see China replacing the United States as the world’s top economy in about 
a decade.17  The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which 
gathers IP statistics from ninety IP offices around the world, reported that 
in 2009, the CTMO received a quarter of all trademark applications 
worldwide.18  Even after adjustment for differences between single-class 
and multi-class filing systems,19 China still had 2.3 times more trademark-
filing activities than the second highest country, the United States.20 
With the increasing importance of the Chinese market in international 
trade, protection of trademarks against trademark squatters is of much 
interest to many foreign businesses entering China.  This Note attempts to 
illuminate the reasons why trademark squatting has proliferated in China as 
well as examine recent developments in China’s Supreme Court.  It also 
concludes with a discussion of whether the new amendment to China 
Trademark Law will actually allow trademark owners to combat squatters. 
Part II traces the development of Chinese Trademark Law, beginning 
with the pre-modern era and extending through post-Mao Zedong times, by 
looking at both the modern development of trademark law and the external 
and internal forces that pushed modernization forward.  Part III examines 
the current Chinese Trademark Law in further detail.  It focuses 
specifically on those characteristics that create an environment in which 
trademark squatting can more easily occur.  Part IV discusses recent 
developments in China in the form of Supreme Court opinions and an 
upcoming amendment to trademark law.  Part IV also discusses whether 
these developments will be enough to battle trademark squatters.  Finally, 
in Part V, this Note ends with practical suggestions for practitioners 
seeking to protect trademarks in China. 
 
16 China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second-Biggest Economy, BBC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12427321. 
17 Id.  According to the World Bank, China’s $8.22 trillion economy is now the second largest in 
the world, compared with the $15.68 trillion U.S. economy.  Lee Kuan Yew, Once China Catches Up—
What Then?, FORBES (Sept. 17, 2013, 11:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/currentevents/2013/09/ 
17/once-china-catches-up-what-then/. 
18 WIPO Releases Compilation of Recent IP Statistics, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Sept. 20, 
2011), http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2011/article_0021.html#_ftn1; WIPO IP Facts and 
Figures 2011, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (2011), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ 
freepublications/en/statistics/943/wipo_pub_943_2011.pdf. 
19 In a single-class filing system, a trademark applicant can file one mark in one class per trademark 
application.  In a multi-class filing system, an applicant can file a mark in more than one class in one 
application.  See infra Part III.B. 
20 WIPO Releases Compilation of Recent IP Statistics, supra note 18. 
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II.  DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE TRADEMARK LAW 
 
Despite the country’s long history, China’s modern system of 
intellectual property law, including trademark law, is a relatively young 
institution.21  Examining the development of Chinese Trademark Law as 
well as the different forces that helped shape the law as it stands today 
serves as a helpful backdrop to the subsequent discussion of what 
characteristics of the law allow trademark squatting to persist. 
 
A.  Early Development from the Pre-Modern Era to the Cultural 
Revolution 
 
During its long and rich history of 5,000 years, China has consistently 
been at the forefront of scientific discovery and technological invention.22  
For example, it was the first to invent, among other things, “papermaking, 
printing with movable types, gunpowder, and the compass.”23  The first 
known trademarks have been traced back to the Northern Zhou Dynasty 
(556–580 A.D.), when merchants began to use different marks to 
distinguish their products and craftsmanship from others.24  Yet despite 
such a long history of using trademarks, direct regulation and protection of 
trademarks by the government has been a fairly recent development.25  
China’s first formal trademark law, strongly influenced by foreigners that 
had substantial control over China’s trade at the time, was enacted by the 
Qing Dynasty government in 1904 but was never put into practice.26 
The Republican-era governments that followed the end of the Qing 
Dynasty enacted more comprehensive trademark laws, and in 1923, 
Northern Chinese warlords established China’s first trademark office.27  
Despite these developments, trademark protection in pre-1949 China “was 
largely illusory,” and trademarks were frequently counterfeited in the 
absence of official remedies.28 
The mid-twentieth century brought the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and the establishment of the Chinese Communist 
 
21 See Weiqiu Long, Intellectual Property in China, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 63, 67–71 (1999). 
22 Jessica J. Zhou, Trademark Law & Enforcement in China: A Transnational Perspective, 20 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 415, 417 (2002). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Geoffrey T. Willard, An Examination of China’s Emerging Intellectual Property Regime: 
Historical Underpinnings, the Current System and Prospects for the Future, 6 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 411, 413 (1996). 
26 Zhou, supra note 22, at 418; JIANQIANG NIE & KEISUKE IIDA, THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 179 (2006). 
27 Willard, supra note 25, at 414. 
28 Id. at 415. 
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Party.29  The Cultural Revolution that followed brought developments in 
intellectual property law to a grinding halt.30  Basing their new legal system 
on the Soviet model, the PRC’s early intellectual property law system was 
based on the idea that individual accomplishments belonged to all of society.31  
Not surprisingly, “individual ownership of intellectual property . . . did not 
fare well within this [ideological framework],” and trademark registration 
as well as regulatory supervision of domestic trademarks nearly 
disappeared.32 
 
B.  Transition to China’s Modern Trademark Law 
 
It wasn’t “until the post-Mao Zedong era of the 1980s that China 
began building a formal legal system.”33  With the recognition that a legal 
structure that created a business environment more inviting to foreign 
investors was essential for economic development,34 China began to 
implement new regulations that improved protection of intellectual 
property.35 
The present legal system in China, including trademark law, was 
founded on the Chinese Constitution promulgated in 1982 (1982 
Constitution), which differed considerably from the first Constitution of 
China, promulgated in 1954.36  On August 23, 1982, the Fifth National 
People’s Congress of China adopted a trademark law, and within three 
years, the State Council of China promulgated the Implementing 
Regulations of the Trademark Law, which served to address specific 
application of the laws.37  Essentially, this new law “made it possible for 
individuals and institutions, in addition to enterprises, to apply for 
trademark registration.”38  Furthermore, the new law authorized a private 
right of action against infringing marks, though damages for infringement 
 
29 Id. at 414–15. 
30 Id.  See generally LASZLO LADANY, LAW AND LEGALITY IN CHINA: THE TESTAMENT OF A 
CHINA-WATCHER 72–78 (1992). 
31 WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE 56–57 (1995). 
32 Zhou, supra note 22, at 420–21. 
33 Jessica C. Wong, The Challenges Multinational Corporations Face in Protecting Their Well-
Known Trademarks in China, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 937, 941 (2006). 
34 See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA, FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 243–59 
(1995) (discussing the economic reforms undertaken during this period). 
35 Zhou, supra note 22, at 416 (“China’s long-time inability to join the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) had been largely attributable to political oppositions from the U.S. and Europe claiming, among 
other things, that China could not provide adequate protection for intellectual property rights.”). 
36 Long, supra note 21. 
37 Id. at 67. 
38 Zhou, supra note 22, at 426.  For general commentary on the 1983 Trademark Law, see L. Mark 
Wu-Ohlson, A Commentary on China’s New Patent and Trademark Laws, 6 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 86, 
126 (1984). 
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Partly in response to criticism that China did not provide adequate 
enforcement against infringing trademarks,40 the Standing Committee of 
the Seventh National People’s Congress of China subsequently revised the 
Trademark Law of 1982 on February 22, 1993.41  Corresponding with those 
revisions, the State Council of China also revised the Implementing 
Regulations of the Trademark Law of 1983, once each in 1988 and 1993.42  
The amendments expanded the categories of actions that constituted acts of 
infringements, as well as implemented rules that imposed higher ranges of 
fines and criminal penalties.43 
 
C.  External and Internal Pressures Continue to Shape Chinese IP 
Law 
 
Both external and internal pressures have since pushed China forward 
in the development of its current intellectual property laws.44  Externally, 
the United States has been the most aggressive proponent pushing for 
stronger intellectual property right enforcement in China, repeatedly 
threatening the country with “economic sanctions, trade wars, non-renewal 
of Most Favored Nation status, and opposition to entry into the World 
Trade Organization.”45  Since 1979, with the first Sino-American bilateral 
agreement, the Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of 
America and the People’s Republic of China,46 China has relented under 
U.S. pressure.  The two countries signed bilateral agreements in 199247 and 
 
39 Zhou, supra note 22, at 426. 
40 William P. Alford, Don’t Stop Thinking About . . . Yesterday: Why There Was No Indigenous 
Counterpart to Intellectual Property Law in Imperial China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 3, 5–6 (1993) (“[In] the 
early 1990s, the United States government labeled both the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) as 
principal culprits in the infringement of billions of dollars of American intellectual property.  In 
consequence, the United States Trade Representative launched trade actions against both the PRC and 
ROC, resulting, after bitter negotiations, in the conclusion by each of agreements in 1992 to revise their 
intellectual property laws to meet American concerns.”). 
41 Long, supra note 21, at 69. 
42 Id. 
43 See Hamideh Ramjerdi & Anthony D’Amato, The Intellectual Property Rights Laws of the 
People’s Republic of China, 21 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 169, 177–78 (1995). 
44 Luo & Ghosh, supra note 11, at 128–31.  For a discussion on how intellectual property regimes 
in developing countries go through phases according to internal and U.S. trade pressure, see Ruixue 
Ran, Well-Known Trademark Protection in China: Before and After the TRIPS Amendments to China’s 
Trademark Law, 19 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 231, 245 (2002). 
45 Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-
First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 132–33 (2000). 
46 Agreement on Trade Relations, July 7, 1979, U.S.-P.R.C, 31 U.S.T. 4651. 
47 Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17, 1992, U.S.-
P.R.C, T.I.A.S. No. 12036. 
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1995,48 in which China promised to increase protection of intellectual 
property within its borders.49 
International treaties and non-binding international standards were 
also a key force in shaping China’s current intellectual property laws.50  To 
demonstrate its commitment towards intellectual property protection to the 
international community, China began signing treaties and joining IP rights 
organizations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
in 1980.51  In preparing to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
which it did in December 2001, China undertook a complete overhaul of its 
intellectual property law system, amending its copyright, patent, and 
trademark laws.52  These “millennium amendments” shaped China’s 
trademark laws to conform better to the TRIPS Agreement, such as by 
strengthening protection of “well-known” marks, removing time limits for 
challenging marks acquired by fraud or other unfair means, adding judicial 
review of all trademark office administrative decisions, and strengthening 
enforcement by allowing preliminary injunctions.53 
However, to characterize the millennium amendments as China’s 
passive response to external factors would not give a complete picture of 
the forces behind the change, as the rapidly changing domestic conditions 
also necessitated modernization of Chinese intellectual property law.54  
Most significantly, with the emergence of a socialist market economy, the 
notion of private profit became justifiable and the National People’s 
Congress saw the need to remove outdated provisions from the “command 
economy” that existed previously.55  Yet these developments proved to be 
inadequate in providing protection against trademark squatters. 
 
III.  CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE TRADEMARK LAW 
THAT FOSTER TRADEMARK SQUATTING 
 
How is it that despite these advancements in the modernization of 
 
48 Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26, 1995, U.S.-P.R.C., 34 I.L.M. 881. 
49 Luo & Ghosh, supra note 11, at 131. 
50 Id. 
51 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 
1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3; Wong, supra note 33, at 941. 
52 Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-
WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 908–14 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode 
II)].  For the text of the amended trademark law, see Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa (中
华人民共和国商标法) [Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2001, effective Oct. 27, 2001) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Nov. 
20, 2001, available at http://english.ipr.gov.cn/lawsarticle/laws/lawsar/trademark/200608/233124_1.html 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2012) [hereinafter PRC Trademark Law of 2001]. 
53 Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II), supra note 52, at 910–11. 
54 Id. at 914. 
55 Id. at 917–18. 
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trademark law, trademark squatting still flourishes?  This part examines 
characteristics of Chinese Trademark Law that are relevant in creating an 
environment that is amenable to trademark squatting: the first-to-file 
system, single-class filing, the heightened requirements for well-known 
status, and the language barrier. 
 
A.  First-to-File as Opposed to First-to-Use 
 
China follows a first-to-file system for trademarks.56  Unlike the 
United States, which requires, among other things, proof of use of a 
trademark in commerce before allowing registration, the earliest applicant 
in China need not show use in commerce.57  Article 29 of China’s 
Trademark Law explains the procedure: 
 
Where two or more applicants apply for the registration of 
identical or similar trademarks for the same or similar goods, the 
preliminary approval, after examination, and the publication shall 
be made for the trademark which was first filed.  Where 
applications are filed on the same day, the preliminary approval, 
after examination, and the publication shall be made for the 
trademark which was the earliest used, and the applications of the 
others shall be refused and their trademarks shall not be 
published.58 
 
The current Regulations for the Implementation of the Trademark Law 
of the PRC further specify that if use was started on the same day or if 
neither trademark is in use, all of the applicants must consult with each 
other to submit an agreement to the Trademark Office.59  If an agreement is 
not reached, the Trademark Office will draw lots to determine which 
application to register.60  Although Article 31 of the Trademark Law states 
that an application for the registration of a trademark shall not create any 
prejudice to the prior right of another person nor should unfair means be 
used to preemptively register the trademark of some reputation that another 
person has used, “it is unclear precisely what this language means and the 
 
56 PRC Trademark Law of 2001, supra note 52, art. 29; Campbell & Pecht, supra note 6, at 78. 
57 U.S. trademark law specifies that the United States Patent and Trademark Office will not issue 
trademark registration until the applicant files a verified statement that the mark is in use in commerce.  
15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), (d) (2001); see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 
Stat. 284 (2011). 
58 PRC Trademark Law of 2001,supra note 52, art. 29. 
59 Regulation for the Implementation of the Trademark Law art. 19 (promulgated by State Council, 
Aug. 3, 2002, effective Sept. 15, 2002), http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/lawsarticle/laws/lawsar/trademark/ 
200604/233111_1.html (China). 
60 Id. 
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extent to which it is enforced.”61 
Thus, China’s system requires no evidence of prior use or ownership, 
leaving registration of popular foreign marks open to third parties.62  This 
has been, and will likely continue to be, an enormous impediment to 
foreign companies entering China.  An American company, by using a 
mark that they themselves developed, may have its goods seized, be unable 
to use its mark, and may even find itself as the defendant in a suit for 
infringement because a squatter already registered the trademark.63 
However, the first-to-file system cannot be seen as the sole reason for 
the proliferation of trademark squatting in China, since most countries that 
follow the civil law tradition base trademark rights on registration and 
“give few if any rights to a prior unregistered trademark user.”64  The first-
to-use system used in the United States is grounded in English common 
law and prevails only in countries that follow the common law tradition, 
such as Canada and Australia.65 
 
B.  Single-Class Filing as Opposed to Multi-Class Filing 
 
Budweiser shoes?  Mercedes toaster ovens?  While neither Budweiser 
nor Mercedes plan to place their names on shoes or kitchen appliances, 
enterprising trademark squatters have already registered these brand names 
for use on “everything from house wares to clothing sold in China.”66  This 
is possible due to another difference from the trademark laws of the United 
States: China requires single-class, as opposed to multi-class, trademark 
applications.67 
When filing trademark applications, most countries require that the 
goods and services in the application be grouped in various classes under 
the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of 
the Registration of Marks (the Nice Classification).68  A product is divided 
into classes according to its function, or if there is no apparent function, 
 
61 PRC Trademark Law of 2001,supra note 52, art. 31; Campbell & Pecht, supra note 6, at 79. 
62  Intellectual Property Rights, EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES BEIJING-CHINA, beijing.usembassy-
china.org.cn/iprtrade.html (last visited May 14, 2014). 
63 Breann M. Hill, Achieving Protection of the Well-Known Mark in China: Is There a Lasting 
Solution?, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 281, 288 (2009). 
64 Jefferson Perkins, Fighting Foreign Trademark Piracy, 24 DCBA BRIEF 28, 29 (2011). 
65 Id. 
66 JEROEN LALLEMAND, SPECIAL REPORT TRADEMARKS IN CHINA: LAND OF OPPORTUNITY POSES 
UNIQUE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RISKS FOR BRAND OWNERS 2 (Dec. 2011), available at 
http://trademarks.thomsonreuters.com/sites/default/files/rsrc_assets/docs/china_special_report.pdf. 
67 Single Class vs. Multi-Class Trademark Applications, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N (last visited Nov. 
21, 2012), http://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/SingleClassvsMulti-ClassTrademark 
Applications.aspx. 
68 Id. 
CHANG_FINAL_WEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/14 7:35 PM 




according to its material composition.69  Services are divided according to 
the nature of the services performed.70  The current version of the Nice 
Classification consists of thirty-four classes of goods and eleven classes of 
services, and such classifications streamline and quicken the registration 
process.71 
The single-class filing system that China uses means that there is one 
mark, one class per trademark application, in contrast to the multi-class 
filing system used in the United States where an applicant can file a mark 
in more than one class in one application.72  Thus in China, an applicant 
must file a separate application for each class that they wish to protect their 
trademarks.  The only way to be fully protected in China is to repeat the 
trademark application process dozens of times for China’s forty-five 
trademark categories, each of which has multiple sub-categories.73  Unless 
a corporation does so, a trademark squatter could snatch up one or more of 
the remaining categories to sell products of their own or to attempt to sell 
the category back to the corporation at an inflated price.  The difficulties 
that Apple faced because it registered its iPhone trademark in the wrong 
subclass are a good illustration of the consequences of not being familiar 
with the single-class filing system.74 
 
C.  It’s Hard to Be Well-Known in China 
 
In addition to the systematic difficulties that overseas brands face due 
to China’s first-to-file rule as well as the single-filing system, another 
difficulty that arises in combating trademark squatters comes from the high 
evidentiary requirements that trademark owners face in order to be deemed 
famous in China, which would afford them the added protection of being a 
“well-known” unregistered mark.75 
Well-known marks are given extensive rights and privileges under 
Chinese Trademark Law.  The current Chinese Trademark Law provides 
that if a well-known mark is registered in China, the owner of the mark can 
exclude others from registering, reproducing, or translating the mark across 





72 Mary M. Squyres & Nanette Norton, Choice of Class in Which to File—Single or Multi-Class 
Filing, in 1 TRADEMARK PRAC. THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 4:14 (2012) (“As many countries change 
their laws, they are moving away from this system in that it is more cumbersome for record-keeping 
purposes, both for a docket and for number of files.”).  
73 LALLEMAND, supra note 66. 
74 See supra text accompanying notes 2–4. 
75 Mary K. Alexander, Note, The Starbucks Decision of the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s 
Court: A Victory Limited to Lattes?, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 881, 894–95 (2008). 
76 Luo & Ghosh, supra note 11, at 122–23. 
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can prevent the mark’s use or registration in similar or identical categories 
of goods in China so long as the mark is deemed well known. 
The Chinese courts will consider the following factors in determining 
whether a mark is well known: 
 
(1) reputation of the mark to the relevant public; (2) time period 
for the owner’s continued use of the mark; (3) consecutive time 
period, extent and geographical area of advertisement of the 
mark; (4) records of protection of the mark as a well-known 
mark; and (5) any other factors relevant to the mark’s 
reputation.77 
 
The 2003 Provisions on the Determination and Protection on Well-Known 
Trademarks describe these factors in greater detail and list what types of 
evidence a trademark owner may submit to prove that its mark is well 
known.78 
In the past, Chinese Trademark Law was interpreted to require the 
trademark in question to be famous inside of China.79  However, with the 
amendment of the laws to consider the “relevant public,” as opposed to the 
entire Chinese public, the test for well-known trademarks has shifted 
slightly, but the requirements are still stringent.  While the 2003 Provisions 
define “relevant public” to include “consumers of the type of goods and/or 
services to which the mark applies,” it is unclear which “consumers” need 
to be considered.80  A court interpreting these definitions may determine 
that “consumers” mean only actual purchasers, not potential purchasers or 
 
77 PRC Trademark Law of 2001, supra note 52, art. 14. 
78 Article 3 of the 2003 Provisions indicates that the following types of evidence may be used to 
show that a mark is well known: 
 
(1) documents concerning the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in the 
relevant sector of the public; (2) documents concerning the duration of the use of the 
mark, including those related to the history and scope of the use and the registration of 
the mark; (3) documents concerning the duration, extent and geographical area of any 
promotion of the mark, including the approach to, geographic area of, the type of media 
for and the amount of advertisements for the promotion of the mark; (4) documents 
concerning the record of successful enforcement of rights in the mark, including the 
relevant documents certifying the mark in question was once protected as a well-known 
mark in China or any other country/region; (5) other evidences certifying that the mark is 
well-known, including, in the past three years, the outputs, sales volumes, sales incomes, 
profits and taxes and sales regions etc. of the principal goods to which the mark applies. 
 
Provisions on the Determination and Protection of Well-Known Marks (promulgated by the State Admin. for 
Indus. & Commerce, Apr. 17, 2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=181515 
(China). 
79 Alexander, supra note 75, at 889. 
80 See Provisions on the Determination and Protection of Well-Known Marks. 
CHANG_FINAL_WEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/14 7:35 PM 




consumers in general.  For foreign trademark holders whose goods have 
not entered China yet, or have not been able to reach the greater Chinese 
population, such an interpretation would erect a huge evidentiary barrier for 
achieving well-known status.  This is especially true since Chinese courts 
are least willing to look at evidence of overseas reputation.81 
The Italian Ferrari Company experienced the difficulty of achieving 
well-known mark status over the several years it battled a Chinese 
department store that had registered Ferrari’s prancing horse design as a 
trademark.82  After both the China Trademark Office and the Trademark 
Review and Adjudication board rejected Ferrari’s contention that its 
prancing horse mark was well known, the Italian carmaker turned to the 
Chinese courts.83  Unfortunately, the Ferrari court also held that the mark 
was not well known, primarily because Ferrari had failed to proffer 
evidence of advertising and publicity in China.84 
This difficulty of defining the “relevant public” is compounded by the 
sheer geographic size of China85 as well as the huge economic 
discrepancies across the country.86  Though coastal regions and major cities 
have relatively advanced economies, vast regions exist where the market is 
less developed and consumers have less exposure to foreign brands.87  With 
these barriers to well-known status, so far only a handful of U.S. 
trademarks have been deemed well known, including Disney, Wal-Mart, 
Pioneer, and Barbie.88 
 
D.  The Language Barrier: Three Marks for Every Brand 
 
The language barrier that exists between China and other countries is a 
complicating factor outside of the legal framework that also frequently 
comes into play. 
Pfizer, Inc. hit it big with its blockbuster drug, Viagra, in the United 
States and many other countries.89  As the largest pharmaceutical company 
 
81 Alexander, supra note 75, at 895; see also Jing, supra note 9 
82 For details of Ferrari’s “horsing saga,” see Luo & Ghosh, supra note 11, at 141–47. 
83 Id. at 141–43. 
84 Id. 
85 China’s total area is 3,696,100 square miles, which is larger than the United States.  China Quick 
Facts, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at http://www.britannica.com/topic/111803/China-quick-
facts (last visited Apr. 1, 2014); United States Quick Facts, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/616563/United-States-quick-facts (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
86 See Richard S. Gruner, Intellectual Property in the Four Chinas, 37 INT’L L. NEWS, Spring 2008, 
at 1 (arguing that the regional characteristics and business circumstances of the four regions in China 
create four very different environments for IP enforcement). 
87 Luo & Ghosh, supra note 11, at 147. 
88 Breann M. Hill, Comment, Achieving Protection of the Well-Known Mark in China: Is There a 
Lasting Solution?, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 281, 291 (2009). 
89 The drug was an immediate success after its release in 1998, generating billions of dollars in 
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in the world by revenue,90 there is no doubt that it has access to the best 
legal and business resources to protect its intellectual property rights 
around the world.  Pfizer had been targeting China as a big market for 
Viagra for years, illustrated by its investment of over five hundred million 
dollars in the PRC for production facilities as well as the opening of a 
research and development center in Shanghai.91  Ironically, however, Pfizer 
does not own the most popular name for Viagra in China, Weige (伟哥), 
which means “Great Older Brother,” but instead owns WaiAike (万艾可), a 
transliteration of Viagra that has no meaning in Chinese and lacks the 
popularity and appeal of Weige.92  Weige is owned by a Chinese 
pharmaceutical company, who first registered the mark when the Chinese 
media coined Viagra by that term.93  Despite many attempts to challenge 
the Weige mark, Pfizer has been unsuccessful in gaining ownership of the 
mark.94 
Pfizer’s difficulties illustrate a method that is frequently used by 
trademark squatters to infringe on a trademark owner’s rights.  Because 
English trademarks are commonly referred to by a Chinese transliteration, 
once an unofficial Chinese-language name gains popularity, a Chinese 
entity may obtain a registration for that name before the original trademark 
owner can do so.95 
Furthermore, due to the intricacies of the language, a single western 
brand will typically have at least three marks in China: the original brand 
name, the “sound-alike” version, and the definition of what the brand 
means in Mandarin.96  But because there are numerous similar characters, 
forms, and sounds, this creates great fodder for creative pirating.  
Trademark squatters can manipulate the form, sound, or meaning of a 
trademark so that they can register confusingly similar marks of their 
own.97 
 
IV.  NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN EFFORTS TO COMBAT 
TRADEMARK SQUATTING 
 
Though trademark squatting persists due to factors previously 
discussed, new developments within the past few years signal that China is 
 
revenue.  See Daniel Chow, Lessons from Pfizer’s Disputes over Its Viagra Trademark in China, 27 
MD. J. INT’L L. 82, 85 (2012). 
90 John LaMattina, The Challenges in Staying #1 in Big Pharma, FORBES (July 13, 2012, 12:43 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2012/07/13/the-challenges-in-staying-1-in-big-pharma/. 
91 Chow, supra note 89, at 83. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 87. 
94 Id. at 91–92. 
95 Id. at 87–88. 
96 LALLEMAND, supra note 66, at 6. 
97 Id. 
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moving towards a more forceful legal approach against bad-faith squatters.  
This part discusses recent developments within the Supreme People’s Court 
of China, as well as the 2013 amendment to China’s Trademark Law. 
 
A.  The Supreme Court’s 2011 Opinions 
 
On December 16, 2011, the Supreme People’s Court of China released 
Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Giving Full Play to the 
Functional Role of Intellectual Property Trials in Advancing the Great 
Development and Prosperity of Socialist Culture and Promoting 
Independent and Coordinated Economic Development (Opinions).98  These 
Opinions included 30 specific comments covering various IP issues.99 
Pertaining to trademarks, the Supreme Court emphasized, through the 
Opinions, the importance of curbing bad faith registrations making 
apparent that the Court is aware of this persistent issue and intends for it to 
be considered more thoroughly in adjudication.100  On the issue of well-
known marks, the Opinions imply that even if there is lack of recognition 
of the well-known trademark or an absence of solid evidence of bad faith, 
the courts could still evaluate the similarity between squatters’ marks and 
brand owners’ marks to determine if there is likelihood of confusion.101  
Courts will make full use of the Trademark Law and consider reputation 
and distinctiveness of trademarks, the real intention to use a trademark, and 
the bad faith in trademark use to crack down on trademark squatting.102 
Another promising development is the introduction of “bad faith 
trademark registration” as a defense in trademark infringement cases.103  
This means that when a trademark squatter brings a trademark infringement 
action against the true owner of a trademark, the defendant can defend the 
action by claiming the trademark requesting protection was registered in 
bad faith. 
Some see this as a strong message from the Supreme Court that IP 
judges should take progressive approaches to stop trademark squatting 
 
98 See Zhen Feng et al., Full Review of the Opinions from the Supreme People’s Court of China on 
Giving Full Play to the Functional Role of Intellectual Property Trials (Issued Dec 2011), HOGAN 





101 He Jing, Chinese Court Backed Up LVMH in Its Fight Against Trademark Squatters, ZY 
PARTNERS LEGAL NEWSLETTER (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.zypartners.com/zjys/blog/show_e.asp? 
newsid=93. 
102 Huang Hui & Yang Mingming, Trademark Squatting: Fighting Against Trademark Squatters in 
China, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REV. (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.worldipreview.com/article/fighting-
against-trademark-squatters-in-china. 
103 Feng et al., supra note 98. 
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activities, and argue that Chinese courts have become more reasonable and 
consistent in their rulings since the Opinions were issued.104  However, it 
remains to be seen how strong of an influence the Opinions will have as 
more lower courts interpret the Supreme Court’s guidance over the long 
term. 
 
B.  2013 Amendment of Trademark Law 
 
It has been over ten years since the revision of Chinese Trademark 
Law.  Since the last revision in 2001, the country has made continuous 
efforts to pass a third amendment, which would bring Chinese Trademark 
Law into alignment with the Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks, 
which was signed by China in 2007.105  The government has released 
various drafts for public comment.  The State Administration for Industry 
and Commerce released the first draft for public comment in 2009, 
followed by a 2011 draft by the State Council.106  The National People’s 
Congress released a final draft for public comment in December of 2012, 
which was finally approved on August 30, 2013.107  The new law will be 
implemented on May 1, 2014.108 
The third amendment makes several, significant changes to Chinese 
Trademark Law.  First, after the implementation of the amendment, 
applicants for trademarks only need to submit one application for multiple 
classes.109  This change simplifies the registration process, and prevents 
enterprising trademark squatters from registering famous trademarks in 
classes that the original owner did not file separate applications. 
Article 7 of the amendment also introduces the principle of good faith 
 
104 Emma Barraclough, How Supreme Court Advice is Changing Trademark Squatting in China, 
222 MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 102, 102 (2012); Jing, supra note 101. 
105 For example, Article 7 of the Singapore Treaty provides for multiple-class application for 
trademarks.  Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks, art. 7, Mar. 27, 2006, S. TREATY DOC. No. 110-
2. 
106 Draft of Trademark Law Amendment for Public Comment, The Legislative Affairs Office of the 
State Council (2011), available at http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-09/02/content_1939013.htm; see Paul 
Ranjard, Opinion on the Third Revision of China’s Trademark Law 2012 Draft, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 30, 
2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e72463b4-637b-437e-87d1-aa2a59fdedce. 
107 Shangbiao Fa Xiuzheng An (Cao’an) Tiaowen (商标法修正案（草案） 条文)  [Amendment 
of the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (Draft)] (proposed by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 28, 2012), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/flca/2012-
12/28/content_1749326.htm (China); Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuan Hui guanyu 
Xiugai (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa) de Jueding, (全国人民代表大会常务委员会关
于修改《中华人民共和国商标法》的决定)  [The Decision to Amend the Trademark Law of the 
People’s Republic of China by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress] (Aug. 30, 
2013), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2013-08/31/content_1805119.htm [hereinafter 
2013 Amendment]. 
108 See 2013 Amendment. 
109 Id. art. 22. 
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in trademark use and registration.110  The addition of good faith language 
into trademark law signals a resolution to restrain bad faith trademark 
squatting, because this article may be used to guard against bad faith 
registrations that cannot be stopped by other specific grounds within the 
law.111 
Also, under the amended Article 34, if a trademark applicant has a 
contract, business, or geographical relationship with the right holder of an 
existent trademark, the registration can be identified and denied as 
malicious squatting.112  Furthermore, registration will not be granted to 
applications for trademarks imitating a registered well-known trademark in 
a different classification.113 
Finally, the 2013 amendment allows for a stronger protection system 
for trademark owners.  In calculating damages, the new law lowers the 
burden of proof for the trademark owner, as it allows courts to order the 
infringer to provide its accounting books and relevant materials necessary 
to calculate damages.114  Statutory damages have been increased from a cap 
of RMB 500,000 to RMB 3,000,000.115  The 2013 amendment also allows 
punitive damages of up to 3 times normal damages, which is the first time 
punitive damages have been introduced into Chinese intellectual property 
laws.116 
However, the amendment also included some disappointing features.  
Under current law, a trademark owner can oppose an application made in 
bad faith at the Chinese Trade Mark Office, and if unsuccessful it can 
appeal to the Trade Mark Review and Adjudication Board and then to the 
courts.117  Under the amended law, if an opposition at the Chinese Trade 
Mark Office is unsuccessful, the mark is granted and the trademark owner 
must then file a revocation action at the Trade Mark Review and 
Adjudication Board.118  This simpler process, probably designed to deal 
with the backlog at the Chinese Trade Mark Office and Trade Mark 
Review and Adjudication Board, may let trademark squatters assert their 
registered mark even sooner than before.119  Brand owners who have lost 
their opposition filing will now face a disadvantageous situation in which a 
 
110 Id. art. 7. 
111 King & Wood Mallesons, Eight Key Points about the Third Amendment to the PRC Trademark 
Law, MONDAQ (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/x/261502/Trademark/Eight+Key+Points+ 
about+the+Third+Amendment+to+the+PRC+Trademark+Law. 
112 2013 Amendment. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. art. 63. 
115 Id. 
116 Id.; King & Wood Mallesons, supra note 111. 
117 PRC Trademark Law of 2001, supra note 52, art. 35. 
118 2013 Amendment art. 35. 
119 Peter Ollier, China Backs Away From Bad Faith Crackdown, MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 135, 
135 (2011). 
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squatter can obtain and hold the full registered trademark throughout the 
entire invalidation process.120 
 
C.  Are These Efforts Enough? 
 
The Opinions by the Supreme Court, as well as the 2013 amendment 
to Chinese Trademark Law, are significant steps in China’s movement 
towards increased protection of trademarks.  However, it is unlikely that 
these measures will suffice in the fight against trademark squatting. 
First of all, the language barrier is a persistent issue.  The linguistic 
complexity of the Chinese language makes it difficult for trademark owners 
to anticipate what the popular transliteration will be and therefore is a 
creative heaven for trademark pirates.  The language issue is an inherent 
difficulty of entering the Chinese market and is best dealt with by increased 
awareness and preparation by trademark owners. 
Furthermore, the marginal changes in trademark law are unlikely to 
prevent trademark squatting because the primary reason why squatting 
persists is not a lack of law, but the lack of enforcement of the law.  Even 
after joining the WTO, China remained the single largest source of 
counterfeit and pirated products worldwide.121  Actual enforcement of 
intellectual property rights within China continued to be insufficient.  In 
2005, less than one percent of the total copyright and trademark cases 
handled by administrative enforcement authorities were turned over to the 
police for prosecution.122  It is clear that although foreign pressure on China 
has been effective in promulgating modern trademark laws, the pressure 
has been less successful in strengthening enforcement.123 
Administrative enforcement efforts are hindered by localism, a lack of 
financial resources, and the inadequacy of penalties against infringers.124  
Since the central government’s decision to decentralize, local governments 
rose in power and formed localized administrative bureaucracies across 
China.125  This poses problems for IP enforcement as local officials, 
themselves, often profit from counterfeit goods through kickbacks and 
bribes.126  These local governments were also reluctant to invest the 
financial resources necessary to enforce intellectual property rights, and 
 
120 King & Wood Mallesons, supra note 111. 
121 Kevin C. Lacey, China and the WTO: Targeting China’s IPR Record, 2 LANDSLIDE 33, 33 
(2010). 
122 Id. 
123 See Gillian Kassner, China’s IP Reform: State Interests Align with Intellectual Property Protection 
(Again), JOLT DIGEST (Apr. 24, 2012, 8:27 PM), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/patent/chinas-ip-reform-
state-interests-align-with-intellectual-property-protection-again. 
124 Wong, supra note 33, at 965. 
125 See Andrew Evans, Taming the Counterfeit Dragon: The WTO, TRIPS and Chinese Amendments to 
Intellectual Property Laws, 31 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 587, 590–91 (2003). 
126 Id at 591. 
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general inefficiencies of decentralized enforcement compounded into great 
hindering of enforcement.127  “If administrative mechanisms of protection 
were more successful . . . fewer parties would [need to] initiate legal 
proceedings,” which have the added benefit of reducing the backlog in 
Chinese courts.128 
Similarly, though judicial enforcement has improved with the 
modernization of trademark laws, it is also plagued by many problems, 
including the lack of resources, difficulty in enforcing judgments, 
inadequacy of penalties, and the lack of judicial independence.129  Other 
speculations about reasons for China’s weak intellectual property 
enforcement also point to China’s low average incomes, the country’s 
position as a net importer of goods and services, and the lack of cultural 
recognition of intellectual property rights.130  Clearly, simply amending 
trademark laws is not a perfect solution. 
 
V.  SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF 
CHINESE TRADEMARK LAW AND ENFORCEMENT 
 
In finding possible solutions to China’s trademark squatting problem, 
it is useful to consider how other countries were able to make changes that 
helped alleviate trademark squatting. 
South Korea is also a first-to-file country that has “a cottage industry 
of very sophisticated trademark squatters.”131  However, South Korea has 
made several significant changes towards the goal of combating the issue, 
which China could also implement.  The Korean Intellectual Property 
Office responded to trademark squatting in South Korea by “lowering the 
standard for famous marks”—equivalent to “well-known marks” in 
China—if “marks [have] been in use in other countries.”132  As an example 
of the lowered standard for famous marks, when a South Korean company 
filed and registered marks related to Häagen-Dazs—“complete with the 
two As and the umlaut”—for use on handbags, the patent court sided with 
the original Häagen-Dazs mark on grounds that the mark was famous in 
Japan and, therefore, protected as a famous mark in South Korea.133  China 
should follow South Korea’s lead by lowering the standard for well-known 
 
127 Id. 
128 Wong, supra note 33, at 966. 
129 Id. at 667–72. 
130 See Mark Liang, A Three-Pronged Approach: How the United States Can Use WTO Disclosure 
Requirements to Curb Intellectual Property Infringement in China, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 285, 290–93 
(2010). 
131 JEROEN LALLEMAND, SPECIAL REPORT TRADEMARKS IN KOREA: BRANDING THE NEW 
CULTURAL WAVE 8 (June 2012), http://trademarks.thomsonreuters.com/sites/default/files/rsrc_assets/ 
docs/south_korea_special_report_1.pdf. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. (citation omitted). 
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marks so that use in other countries is considered. 
Another significant move that South Korea made was its decision to 
join the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), a treaty signed in 
2006.134  The ACTA is an “initiative by key trading partners to strengthen 
the international legal framework for effectively combating global 
proliferation of commercial-scale counterfeiting and piracy.”135  Though 
skeptics maintain that the ACTA would not have enough of an influence on 
China to halt intellectual property infringement,136 by joining such 
agreements, China can increase its enforcement efforts as well as signal to 
the world that it is serious about combating squatters. 
Lastly, what China needs in order to follow the South Korean example 
is time to create homegrown intellectual property.  “South Korean 
companies are prolific filers of patent and trademark applications for 
inventions, products, and brands,” which became a strong driving force in 
the South Korean government’s push for strong intellectual property 
enforcement both domestically and abroad.137  Similar to the development 
that South Korea experienced a few decades ago, “China has followed the 
typical pattern of a developing nation by depending heavily on foreign 
investment and imported technology before being able to generate 
substantial internal growth and technological advancement on its own.”138  
Due to the lack of technological innovation in China, strict intellectual 
property enforcement does not bring great benefit to Chinese companies, 
which leads to decreased government incentive for enforcement both at 
home and abroad.139  Over time, as China develops so that its domestic 
innovation becomes a major driving force of the economy, there is no 
doubt that the country, as a whole, will move towards increased 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
 
 
134 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), Oct. 11, 2001, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Nov. 23, 2012). 
135 The parties included the United States, the European Union, Switzerland, Japan, Australia, the 
Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Mexico, Jordan, Morocco, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Canada.  Id. 
136 See, e.g., Yicun Chen, The Impact of ACTA on China’s Intellectual Property Enforcement, 
NAT’L L. REV. (2012), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/impact-acta-china-s-intellectual-property-
enforcement (“[E]nforcement of the international IP agreements like ACTA is difficult for many 
developing countries partly because the developed countries have set the intellectual property 
standards. . . . . [S]ince China and many other developing countries lack technological innovation, the 
incentives provided by intellectual property rights (for investment in research and development) are not 
meaningful.”); see generally Leroy J. Pelicci Jr., China and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement—
ACTA Faith, or ACT Futility?: An Exposition of Intellectual Property Enforcement in the Age of 
Shanzhai, 1 PENN ST. J. L & INT’L AFF. 121 (2012). 
137 LALLEMAND, supra note 131, at 2. 
138 John R. Allison & Lianlian Lin, The Evolution of Chinese Attitudes Toward Property Rights in 
Invention and Discovery, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 735, 775 (1999). 
139 Chen, supra note 136. 
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VI.  SUGGESTIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS 
 
Though the development of Chinese Trademark Law is ongoing, 
practitioners still need to operate wisely within the current legal framework 
so that they can protect the intellectual property of their clients.  The 
following are several practical tips that every practitioner should consider 
when operating under Chinese Trademark Law. 
First, since there is no requirement that a trademark be in use before a 
trademark application can be filed with the Trademark Office, one 
important strategy that companies would be wise to follow is to file 
trademark applications early, before they begin using a mark in China in 
order to prevent trademark squatters.140  “The Trademark Law provides that 
a trademark can be cancelled if it is not used for three consecutive years,” 
but “the trademark registration process can take anywhere from [eighteen] 
to [twenty-four] months or longer, meaning that the trademark applicant 
may have four to five years before it is required to show it is using its 
trademark or else risk cancellation of its registration.”141  Therefore, even if 
a company does not have immediate plans to enter the Chinese market, if 
its trademark is or is becoming well known in the United States, the 
company should consider filing in advance, before trademark squatters beat 
them to it. 
Second, in China a mark’s sound and meaning all need to be 
protected.  Trademark squatters frequently infringe on a brand’s well-
known mark by manipulating the form, sound, or meaning of the marks, 
which is made possible by an abundance of similar characters, forms, and 
sounds in the complex Chinese language.142  Thus, trademarks best suited 
for China often “convey the unique meaning of the brand without 
describing it literally or copying it phonetically.”143  Furthermore, every 
company trademarking in China not only needs a Chinese character name, 
“but should also apply the appropriate cultural intelligence to ensure the 
brand’s meaning is not lost in translation.”144  A company would not want 
to discover too late that its brand did not translate well, as KFC did when 
they realized that their slogan—“finger lickin’ good”—translated literally 
into Chinese characters meaning “eat your fingers off.”145 
Third, applicants for trademarks are advised to register their marks in 
many classes, especially since this has been made easier by the new 
amendment.  Registration should not be limited to the precise class of 
goods or services in which they plan to use a trademark, “in order to allow 
 
140 Campbell & Pecht, supra note 6, at 79. 
141 Id. 
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room for future expansion and to prevent consumer confusion.”146 
Finally, when all else fails, brand owners who find that their mark has 
already been registered have three options: pay up, wait it out and file for 
cancellation for non-use, or fight it out.  If a brand owner does decide to 
challenge the squatter for the mark, “obtaining, preserving, and presenting 
evidence in the right way is crucial.”147 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
The new amendment to Chinese Trademark Law will be implemented 
in 2014, and many are waiting to see whether the new law is a signal that 
China is serious about protecting intellectual property within its borders.  
Though these new developments, including the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
December 2011 and the upcoming changes to Chinese Trademark Law, 
look promising, these changes will likely not be enough to prevent 
trademark squatters from targeting well-known foreign trademarks.  
Trademark squatting is able to persist largely due to the inherent 
complexity of the language as well as a lack of enforcement of existing 
laws.  Thus, in order to effectively combat trademark squatting, China 
needs to address these underlying causes by lowering the evidentiary 
standards to become a well-known mark, as well as focusing on 
strengthening the enforcement of intellectual property rights.  Until these 
changes are made, practitioners and businesses should be aware of the 
difficulties of protecting trademarks in China, and should take measures to 
intelligently guard their intellectual property. 
China has been taking steps to comply with international standards of 
intellectual property protection, and should continue to do so, such as by 
joining the ACTA.  But the real thrust towards intellectual property 
protection will likely come when China develops homegrown intellectual 
property of its own, which will move China from being reactive to 





147 Barraclogh, supra note 104. 
